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Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Zinke, 892 F.3d 1234 
(D.C. Cir. 2018) 
 
Daniel M. Brister 
 
Due to advances in climate science and an increased 
understanding of coal’s role as a greenhouse gas, Appellant conservation 
organizations sued the Secretary of Interior for failing to supplement the 
1979 Programmatic EIS for the Federal Coal Management Program. The 
D.C. Circuit Court held neither NEPA nor the APA required a 
supplemental EIS and that the court lacked jurisdiction to compel the 
Secretary to prepare one. Expressing sympathy for the Appellants’ 
position, the D.C. Circuit took the unusual step of offering advice to future 
plaintiffs on how they might succeed on similar claims. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Zinke addressed 
whether the United States District Court for the District of Columbia erred 
in holding that an updated review of the Federal Coal Management 
Program (“Coal Program”) was not required under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the Administrative Procedures 
Act (“APA”).1 The Western Organization of Resource Councils and 
Friends of the Earth (“Appellants”) argued that the Secretary of the Interior 
(“Secretary”) was required to supplement the 1979 Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement (“PEIS”) for the Coal Program as a result 
of advances in climate science and improved understanding of the role of 
coal combustion as the single greatest source of atmospheric greenhouse 
gas emissions.2   
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
held that NEPA did not require the Secretary to update the PEIS because 
the 1979 final approval of the Coal Program constituted the only “major 
Federal action” and no further review was necessary in the absence of any 
new action.3 The D.C. Circuit also rejected Appellants’ contention that 
commitments to supplement the PEIS made in the Coal Program’s 
implementing regulations created a legally binding obligation for 
supplementation of the 1979 PEIS even if NEPA did not require it.4 While 
the statements “might have created a binding duty on the agency at one 
point,” to supplement the 1979 PEIS, subsequent amendments to the 
implementing regulations in 1982 released the Secretary from any duty 
                                                 
1.  W. Org. of Res. Councils v. Zinke, 892 F.3d 1234 (D.C. Cir.  
 2018).  
2.  Id. at 1237. 
3.  Id. at 1245. 
4.  Id. 
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that may have arisen under the language of the original regulations beyond 
those specifically mandated by NEPA.5 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In the 1970's, the Secretary commenced a series of administrative 
actions to establish a comprehensive planning system for the granting and 
administration of coal leases. These regulations became known as the 
Federal Coal Management Program and provided a means for the Bureau 
of Land Management (“BLM”) to be more proactive in the processing of 
lease applications.6 In 1979, the Secretary, acting through the BLM, issued 
a PEIS for the Coal Program pursuant to NEPA.7 In July of that year, the 
BLM issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) officially adopting the Coal 
Program.8 The BLM amended the Coal Program’s implementing 
regulations in 1982 and issued a corresponding supplement to the PEIS in 
1985.9 The PEIS has not been supplemented since.10 
In 2014, Appellants sued the Secretary of Interior and other 
Interior officials in district court seeking an order compelling the Secretary 
to supplement the PEIS for the Coal Program due to the changed 
circumstances represented by new science.11 In granting the Secretary’s 
motion to dismiss, the district court held that the BLM had “no duty to 
supplement the 1979 programmatic EIS for the federal coal management 
program because there is no remaining or ongoing major federal action . . 
.”12 Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision.13 
While the appeal was pending in 2016, Interior Secretary Sally 
Jewell froze all new Coal Program leases while the agency prepared a 
supplemental PEIS.14 According to Secretary Jewell, advances in climate 
science required, “. . . a more comprehensive, programmatic review.”15 
With new leases on hold while the Secretary prepared the supplemental 
PEIS, Plaintiffs and Defendant filed a joint motion asking the D.C. Circuit 
to hold the case in abeyance, which it did.16 
Jewell’s replacement, Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke, lifted the 
moratorium in March of 2017, and ordered the immediate cessation of all 
work on the supplemental PEIS.17 Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit granted
                                                 
5.  Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3 (July 6, 2018)). 
6.  Id. at 1238. 
7.  Id. 
8. Id. at 1236. 
9.   Id. at 1237. 
10.  Id. at 1236. 
11.  Id. at 1237. 
12.  Id. at 1236-37 (quoting W. Org. of Res. Councils v. Jewell, 124 F.  
 Supp. 3d 7, 13 (D.D.C. 2015)). 
13.  Id at 1237. 
14.  Id. at 1240. 
15.  Id. (citing Order No. 3338 (Jan. 15, 2016), reprinted at J.A.  
 1476-77). 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id.  
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Appellants’ motion to rescind the abeyance and set a briefing schedule for 
the case.18 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The Appellants asserted that NEPA required the Secretary to issue 
a supplemental PEIS addressing climate change related impacts of the 
Coal Program.19 Since NEPA does not provide a mechanism for private 
citizens to sue to enforce its provisions, the Appellants asserted their claim 
under a specific provision of the APA. The D.C. Circuit therefore 
reviewed the Secretary’s compliance under APA § 706(1), which states 
“reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed.”20 Appellants requested that the D.C. Circuit order 
the Secretary to supplement the PEIS to remedy the Department of 
Interior’s failure to act.21  
Appellants relied upon two arguments they claimed compel the 
Secretary to supplement the PEIS.22 First, they pointed to the 
supplementation requirements in the regulations promulgated by the 
Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), which is the federal agency 
charged with administering NEPA.23 Second, they referred to statements 
the Secretary included in the original PEIS and ROD committing to update 
the environmental analysis if circumstances changed.24 In both the ROD 
and the PEIS, the Secretary promised that the PEIS “would be updated 
when conditions change sufficiently to require new analyses of those 
impacts."25 
The D.C. Circuit held that neither argument mandated the 
Secretary to update the PEIS.26 
A.  NEPA and CEQ Regulations 
CEQ regulations require an agency to supplement an EIS to 
account for “significant new . . . information relevant to environmental 
concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.”27 Appellants 
claimed that recent advances in climate science, which were unavailable 
at the time the original PEIS was written, constituted new information 
under CEQ regulations.28 The Secretary did not disagree with Appellants’ 
contention that the analysis of coal’s impact on climate change in the 
                                                 
18.  Id.  
19.  Id. at 1241. 
20.  Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)).  
21.  Id.  
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Id. at 1245 (quoting PEIS at 3-68, J.A. 328; ROD at 98, J.A.  
 1399). 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii)). 
28.  Id.  
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original PEIS was outdated. Rather, the Secretary argued that no 
supplementation was mandated because no new action had occurred or 
was being proposed.29 
In support of their position, Appellants cited the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources 
Council.30 In Marsh, environmental groups sued to stop a dam under 
construction on a tributary of Oregon’s Rogue River.31 While the 
construction was ongoing, new information emerged that had not been 
available when the project’s EIS was written.32 The Court promulgated a 
two-part test to determine whether the Department has a duty to 
supplement an EIS, and require an agency to take a “hard look” at the 
environmental impacts of an action when (1) a “major federal action” 
remains to be carried out and (2) new information reveals that this 
remaining action will have significant environmental impacts in a manner 
or extent not yet considered.33 The Supreme Court in Marsh agreed with 
the environmental groups’ assertions that the dam’s ongoing construction 
work constituted a “major Federal action” yet to occur, and explained that 
new information could force an agency to supplement an EIS when 
“remaining governmental action would be environmentally 
‘significant.’”34  
 The Appellants argued the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Marsh, 
combined with new climate change data, and the Coal Program’s ongoing 
approval of  individual leases mandated the completion of a new EIS.35 
Appellants further argued the PEIS required supplementation under Marsh 
because the remaining governmental action of approving individual coal 
leases would be environmentally significant.36 The D.C. Circuit disagreed, 
citing the facts of a different United States Supreme Court case, Norton v. 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (“SUWA”), as being more on point.37 
In SUWA, environmental groups sought to compel the BLM to supplement 
an EIS involving a regulatory program (Wilderness Study Areas).38 The 
groups argued that NEPA required the Agency to prepare a supplemental 
EIS in response to changed conditions resulting from increased off-road-
vehicle use.39 In its holding, the Supreme Court reasoned that the “major 
Federal action” in the Wilderness Study Areas project had been completed
                                                 
29.  Id. at 1242 (citing Appellee's Br. 19, Nov. 7. 2017, 15-5294). 
30.  Id. (citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 109  
 S Ct. 1851 (1989)). 
31.  Id. at 1242. 
32.  Id.  
33.  Id.  
34.  Id. at 1241-42 (quoting Appellant’s Br. 30-31, Sept. 15, 2017, 15-
5294 (quoting Marsh, 490 U.S. at 371-74)). 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id.  
37.  Id. at 1243. 
38.  Id. at 1242.  
39.  Id. at 1242-43. 
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upon the “approval of a land use plan[,]” and therefore, found neither  an  
“ongoing ‘major Federal action’ nor a corresponding duty to 
supplement.”40 
In Marsh, the duty to supplement hinged on identifying the 
specific major federal action and the moment it was rendered complete.41 
The Supreme Court held that the action was the in-progress construction 
of the dam.42 The major Federal action identified by the Supreme Court in 
SUWA was the adoption of a comprehensive land use plan which was held 
completed at the moment it was finalized.43 Relying on SUWA, the D.C. 
Circuit  held that there no longer remained an outstanding major federal 
action, as adoption of the overarching Coal Program, rather than the 
ongoing approval of individual leases, constituted the major federal action 
under NEPA.44 According to the D.C. Circuit, the Secretary’s approval of 
the Coal Program in 1979 constituted the only major Federal action 
requiring NEPA analysis.45  
 
B.  The Department’s Prior Statements 
 
Appellants alternatively argued that even if supplementing the 
PEIS was not mandated under NEPA, the agency made a binding 
commitment to do so in the 1979 PEIS and ROD.46 The D.C. Circuit 
agreed that those documents did create certain obligations for the 
Secretary at the time of their issuance, as evidenced by statements that the 
PEIS “would be updated when conditions change sufficiently to require 
new analyses of those impacts.”47 However, the statements’ omission from 
the 1982 revision to the Coal Program “. . . made clear that [the 
Department] did not intend to bind itself to any supplementation duty 
beyond that imposed by NEPA.”48 
 
IV.  ALTERNATE AVENUES AVIALABLE TO APPELLANTS 
 
In its decision, the D.C. Circuit took the unusual step of offering 
advice to potential future plaintiffs on how they might achieve their goals 
through alternate means.49 Proposing “several avenues” by which 
plaintiffs might “raise their claims regarding the climate-change 
implications of coal leasing,” the D.C. Circuit suggested they file a rule 
making petition requesting the Secretary consider the significant  
                                                 
40.  Id. at 1243 (quoting SUWA at 72-73) (emphasis added).  
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. at 1242. 
43.  Id. at 1243. 
44.  Id. at 1244. 
45.  Id. at 1243-44. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. (quoting PEIS at 3-9, J.A. 269; ROD at 98, J.A. 1399). 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. at 1244-45. 
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environmental impacts of the Coal Program in the regulations.50 
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit suggested Appellants could challenge the 
approval of individual coal leases on the grounds that their specific EISs 
fail to consider the cumulative climatological effects of coal leasing.51 If 
the Secretary then attempted to tier the analysis to the PEIS for the Coal 
Program, the PEIS could be challenged as being “too outdated to support 
new federal action.”52 In her Concurrence, Circuit Judge Karen Henderson 
opined that it was unnecessary and inappropriate for the D.C. Circuit to 
identify such alternate litigation strategies.53 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
In holding that neither NEPA nor the agency’s own stated 
commitments compelled the Secretary to undertake a supplemental PEIS 
for the Coal Program, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order 
of dismissal.54 While ultimately rejecting the Appellants’ claims, the D.C. 
Circuit noted the “Appellants raise[d] a compelling argument that the 
Secretary should now revisit the issue [climate change] and adopt a new 
program or supplement its PEIS analysis.”55 Going even further, the D.C. 
Circuit set out specific recommendations for how a future plaintiff might 
successfully litigate on similar claims.56 While the D.C. Circuit may have 
been sympathetic to the Appellants’ goals, its restrictive holding makes it 
more difficult to challenge a PEIS as a result of changed circumstances 
and reinforces the difficulty of challenging an “agency’s failure to 
consider the cumulative climate impacts of federal coal leasing.”57  
  
                                                 
50.  Id. at 1244. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. at 1244. 
53.  Id. at 1246. 
54.  Id. at 1245-46. 
55.  Id. at 1244. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. (quoting Appellants’ Br. 34, Sept. 15, 2017, 15-5294). 
